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POLICY TRANSFER AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
IMPROVEMENT REGIMES 
Sandra Nutley, James Downe, Steve Martin and Clive Grace. 
Introduction 
There is a well established literature on intergovernmental and cross-national learning, 
which includes analyses of policy transfer (e.g. Bennett 1997, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 
2000), policy convergence (e.g. Bennett 1991, Hoberg 2001, Holzinger and Knill 2005), 
policy diffusion (e.g. Berry and Berry 1990, Balla 2001, Walker 1969) and lesson 
drawing (Rose 1993). Much of the existing analysis, particularly in relation to policy 
transfer, is theoretical and evidence is often anecdotal or circumstantial (Bennett 1997, 
Pierson 2003). Empirical work is usually derived from either a small number of case 
studies, which use qualitative approaches to study policy transfer between one or two 
states, or large-N studies, which use quantitative methodologies to study policy diffusion 
and convergence across large numbers of countries (Cook 2008, Dolowitz 2001).  
 
The creation of devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, with 
their own increasingly distinctive public policy agendas, represents ‘a constitutional 
experiment of enormous significance’ (Shortridge 2009: 143) which provides a new 
arena in which to study processes of policy transfer. Recent studies have analysed policy 
divergence in relation to tuition fees in higher education, personal care for the elderly and 
the smoking ban (Jeffrey et al. 2006, Keating et al 2009, Cairney et al. 2009, Cairney 
2009). This chapter focuses on the development and implementation of local government 
performance improvement regimes. The first section examines the concepts of policy 
transfer, policy learning and policy convergence. The second and third sections analyse 
the evolution of local government performance improvement regimes in England 
(Comprehensive Performance Assessment), Scotland (Best Value Audits) and Wales 
(Wales Programme for Improvement) and what this tells us about the extent and nature of 
policy divergence between the three countries. The fourth section assesses the extent of 
and mechanisms for policy transfer and learning between the countries. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the implications of this analysis for understanding of policy 
transfer more widely and for future research. 
POLICY TRANSFER 
Policy transfer refers to the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements and institutions in one political system is used in another (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996, 2000). More recently, Dolowitz (2010) has refined this definition to include 
situations where the movement of information and knowledge from one system to 
another does not necessarily result in its direct use (i.e. does not result in policy change), 
but is stored for potential future use. A range of motivators drive the policy transfer 
process and although, in theory, it is possible to distinguish between voluntary transfer 
(as a result of lesson drawing), direct coercive transfer (the imposition of a policy 
on one country by another), and indirect coercive transfer (where functional 
interdependence creates externalities that lead to policy transfer, sometimes as a result of 
feelings of insecurity and fears about being left behind), policy transfer tends to result 
from a combination of these.  
 
Policy transfer involves policy makers becoming aware of developments elsewhere, but 
they may not necessarily learn much from them (Dolowtiz 2010). By contrast, lesson 
drawing involves significant levels of learning and implies a systematic and rational (or 
bounded rational) process whereby policy makers study developments in other systems 
and evaluate their potential applicability in the home system (Rose 1993, 2006). Lesson 
drawing may result in ‘soft transfer’, the transfer of ideas, concepts and attitudes, or ‘hard 
transfer’, the implementation of specific policy programmes (Dolowitz 2009, Evans and 
Davies 1999). It need not necessarily result in action and policy change. A policy or 
programme may be deemed inappropriate for the home system – a process which Rose 
(1993) calls ‘negative lesson drawing’. Indeed, policies that are successful elsewhere may 
be intentionally rejected because they are considered to be politically unacceptable (Rose 
2004). In addition, because deliberative learning takes place at different levels within a 
political system, those who have drawn lessons from elsewhere may not be in a position 
to exert the influence on the decision making process needed for there to be a change in 
policy (Dolowitz 2010).  
 
The related concept of policy convergence refers to increasing similarity over time in the 
policies adopted by two or more governments or administrative systems. Policy 
convergence does not necessarily indicate the existence of policy transfer (Bennett 1997). 
It may result from policy diffusion - the gradual spread of ideas (Rogers 1995) – or occur 
because countries facing similar economic, social and technological challenges 
independently arrive at similar solutions. Nor, for the reasons explained above, does the 
opposite trend (policy divergence) necessarily indicate that governments have not learnt 
from each other. It is also possible for there to be convergence in some aspects of a policy 
process and not in others. Bennett (1991) who usefully differentiates between five kinds 
of convergence: (a) in policy goals (‘a coming together of intent to deal with common 
policy problems’); (b) in policy content – ‘the statutes, administrative rules, regulations, 
court decisions and so on which enshrine government policies’; (c) in policy instruments 
– regulatory, administrative and judicial tools; (d) in outcomes; and (e) in policy style – 
the way in which policy responses are formulated (for example whether processes of 
policy formulation are consensual or conflictual, rational or incremental, anticipatory or 
reactive, corporatist or pluralist) (1991:218). These categories have been extended by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) to also encompass convergence in policy institutions and 
policy style. 
 
It is important to recognise that policy transfer, learning and convergence are dynamic 
processes that need to be studied over time. Policy transfer and learning are normally 
iterative, rather than one-off, processes involving interactions between actors and 
institutions over the course of a policy cycle, and the extent and character of knowledge 
transfer and learning can vary at different stages in that cycle. In the same vein, cross-
national similarities at one point in time are not necessarily indicative of sustained 
convergence (Bennett 1991). 
 
Policy transfer, learning and convergence can be researched at a number of different 
levels. As noted above, most studies have focused on transfer between nation states. 
However, there is evidence of policy transfer, learning and convergence at sub-national 
level between regions and local authorities (Kern 2010, Wolman and Page 2002) and the 
creation of devolved administrations within the UK, with wide ranging responsibilities 
for health, education, agriculture and other local services, has opened up the possibility 
of new kinds of policy transfer at sub-national levels between England, Scotland and 
Wales. The stop-start nature of devolution in Northern Ireland, and in particular the 
suspension of the Assembly between 2002 and 2007, make it a less useful and less 
directly comparable case study.  
 
As well as seeking to identify whether policy transfer and convergence has occurred, 
researchers have also been interested in identifying why and how it happens. Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996) suggest that convergence can usually be traced to similarities in 
institutions, ideologies and/or ideas, while Bennett (1991) identifies four possible 
mechanisms of convergence: emulation (where state officials copy action taken 
elsewhere); elite networking (convergence due to discussions within trans-national policy 
communities); harmonization (through international regimes); and penetration (by 
external actors and interests). The evidence suggests that geographical proximity, shared 
social and economic characteristics, similarities in institutional arrangements and strong 
cultural ties all help to facilitate policy transfer and convergence (e.g. Knill 2005, 
Lenschow et al. 2005, Hood 2007). And it might therefore be expected that England, 
Scotland and Wales would prove fertile ground for these phenomena. On the other hand, 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify several factors which can constrain policy transfer 
including: the complexity of a policy programme; time constraints – the need for a ‘quick 
fix’; past policy, which can influence where and what policy makers look for; the 
political, bureaucratic and economic resources to implement lessons drawn from 
elsewhere; and institutional and structural constraints on the transference of policies. For 
these reasons, wholesale borrowing of a policy by one country from another is rare. In 
practice, policy makers tend to copy some but not all aspects of a programme or to create 
hybrids which combine elements of policies from several countries. Alternatively, 
studying familiar problems in unfamiliar settings may act a source of inspiration, helping 
to generate novel solutions to problems faced at home. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
IMPROVEMENT REGIMES 
Performance auditing has become increasingly prevalent in many western democracies 
and must rank as one of the most significant public policy innovations of the last two 
decades. The ‘audit explosion’ (Power 1997) has been particularly evident in the UK 
(Hood 2007) where public services audit and inspection now plays a pivotal role in the 
management of a wide range of public services from schools, hospitals, social care 
providers to local government, fire and rescue, and the police (Davis and Martin 2008). 
The recourse to ‘long distant mechanics of control’ (Hoggett 1996) is symptomatic of a 
loss of faith in traditional forms of bureaucratic and professional control (Clarke and 
Newman 1997, Newman 1998, 2001) and a desire by policy makers to find new ways of 
regulating increasingly dispersed and fragmented networks of public service providers 
(Clarke et al. 2000). However, enthusiasm for performance monitoring has not been 
uniform, even in the UK. As the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales became 
increasingly self confident, they have adopted distinctive approaches to central-local 
relations and the regulation of local public services (Laffin 2004, Gallagher et al. 2007). 
Turning their backs on the ‘English’ model of public services reform through the top 
down imposition of targets, testing, league tables and star ratings, the devolved 
administrations have explicitly sought to work in ‘partnership’ with the local 
governments in their countries (Martin and Webb 2009). 
 
These differences are reflected in the local government performance improvement 
regimes which have been developed in the three countries over the last decade. UK 
central government has exerted much tighter control over local authority spending 
(through capping council tax increases and the use of specific grants) than either the 
Scottish Government or Welsh Assembly Government. It has also placed much greater 
emphasis on performance targets – first through Local Public Service Agreements and 
more recently Local Area Agreements - and external inspection. To different degrees, 
ministers in Scotland and Wales have paid more attention than their English counterparts 
to local priorities and adopted a lighter touch approach to inspection and intervention. 
The existence of these contrasting approaches in three countries which share a common 
language, close cultural ties and very similar legal systems, fiscal frameworks, local 
government institutions and policy ambitions poses some important questions. 
 
What is the extent of divergence across the three performance improvement regimes? 
How and why have differences arisen? Has development of the three regimes been 
informed by policy transfer and learning between countries? If so, what are the 
mechanisms by which it has occurred? And have different approaches produced different 
outcomes? In order to examine these issues we undertook a detailed analysis of the 
development and operation of the local government performance regimes, focusing in 
particular on ‘whole authority assessments’. We gathered evidence from three sources: 
detailed analysis of policy documents, legislation and statutory and non statutory 
guidance; a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with forty senior policy makers 
from central government, audit bodies and local government, all of whom had been 
closely involved in the development and implementation of the performance regimes in 
their countries; and a seminar with senior officials from central government departments, 
audit bodies, improvement agencies, and local authorities from all three countries to test 
out our emerging findings and observations. There is always the danger that elite 
interviewees exaggerate their own role in the design of a policy regime and thus play 
down the extent to which they transferred policies from elsewhere. The documentary 
analysis and the seminar aimed to counterbalance this. Interviewees were asked a range 
of questions about the assessment frameworks for local government in their country: how 
they had been developed; what factors had shaped their design; the extent to which policy 
makers and inspectors had learned from elsewhere in the UK; what (if anything) had 
inhibited or facilitated policy transfer; and what they believed the outcomes of the 
assessment frameworks in their countries had been. Interviews were taped and 
transcribed. 
POLICY DIVERGENCE ACROSS THE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
REGIMES 
The data gathered from the documentary review, the interviews and the seminar were 
analysed in terms of the main kinds of convergence derived from Bennett (1991) and 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). The results are summarised in Table 1 and are discussed 
below (for a more detailed comparative analysis of the operation of these three regimes 
see Downe et al 2010). 
Insert Table 1 around here 
Policy goals and instruments 
Policy makers in the three countries have had very similar policy goals and used almost 
identical policy instruments to introduce whole authority assessments of the performance 
of local authorities. In all three cases, assessments are intended to promote improvements 
in local government capacity and performance and were introduced through a 
combination of legislation and statutory and non statutory guidance. The 1999 Local 
Government Act repealed legislation requiring local authorities in England and Wales to 
submit a wide range of services to compulsory competitive tendering. In its place it 
introduced a new duty to achieve ‘Best Value’ (Martin 2000). The Audit Commission 
was charged with inspecting local authority performance in achieving this duty. However, 
it struggled to cope with the volume of work this created and revised guidance issued in 
2003 effectively signaled the abandonment of the Best Value review programmes 
(Downe and Martin 2007). In their place, policy makers in England introduced 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs) which rated each council’s overall 
performance on a five point scale from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent’. Their counterparts in Wales 
took the opportunity to introduce their own form of whole authority assessment which 
was named the Wales Programme for Improvement (WPI). From 1997 to 2003, local 
councils in Scotland adopted a Performance Management and Planning (PMP) 
framework on a voluntary basis as a quid pro quo for a continuing moratorium on 
compulsory competitive tendering. This was similar to, though less tightly specified than 
the Best Value regime. Like their counterparts south of the border, Scottish councils 
agreed to review services and produce plans for improvement which were subject to 
external audit. The 2003 Local Government Act put this process on a statutory footing, 
introducing whole authority assessments known as Best Value Audits (BVAs) which 
evaluated each council’s performance against ten ‘best value’ characteristics laid down in 
guidance (Downe et al. 2008). 
 
In a short space of time all three countries therefore developed remarkably similar 
policies which shared the same objective - promoting improvement in the overall 
performance and capacity of local authorities. They were all overseen by the principal 
audit bodies in their countries - the Audit Commission in England, Audit Scotland 
working on behalf of the Accounts Commission and the Wales Audit Office (WAO). And 
they all focused on the overall management and leadership of local authorities because 
policy makers in all three countries believed that it was ‘corporate capacity’ – reflected in 
clarity of purpose, robust performance management systems, efficient use of resources, 
and effective partnership working – which in the long term determined a council’s ability 
to achieve service improvement (Martin et al. 2010). Or, as the Audit Commission put it, 
a ‘serious and sustained service failure is also a failure of corporate leadership’ (Audit 
Commission 2002: 19). At first sight then whole authority assessments appear to be a 
striking example of policy convergence. Rather than developing distinctive policies 
following devolution, the three countries have adopted very similar policy goals and 
instruments. On closer examination however, there were significant differences and 
divergences in policy content, style and outcomes. 
Policy Content and Style 
We found a number of marked differences in policy content and style. First, there were 
contrasting approaches to developing the frameworks. Whereas CPAs were imposed 
‘top-down’ by central government and the Audit Commission on local authorities with 
relatively little discussion or consultation, both the WPI and BVAs were developed 
through consensual processes in which local government representatives played a 
prominent role. In Scotland, the ten Best Value criteria that underpinned BVAs drew 
heavily on the practices which councils had developed on a voluntary basis since 1997 
and the guidance was formulated by a task force consisting of representatives of Audit 
Scotland, Scottish local authorities and the Scottish Executive. The WPI was also 
developed and then overseen by a tri-partite working group consisting of civil servants 
and senior representatives of the audit bodies and local government, with behind the 
scenes discussions between the Welsh Assembly Government and the Welsh Local 
Government Association (WLGA) playing a particularly important role.  
 
Second, there were significant differences in the nature of the assessment methodologies. 
CPA applied a universal rules-based scoring system. The Scottish and Welsh frameworks 
were less prescriptive and gave far more scope for local priorities and self assessment. 
Best Value auditors in Scotland, for example, sought to judge whether authorities had the 
capacity to achieve the objectives they had set for themselves but did not second guess 
the appropriateness or otherwise of their priorities, and self assessments formed part of 
the evidence base which auditors drew on.  
 
Third, the assumption in England was that local government required robust external 
challenge. CPAs were therefore designed to provide a ‘shock to the system’ and the 
resulting performance rankings used to ‘name and shame’ councils. The Scottish 
framework also included external challenge, but there were no performance rankings. 
The aim was to raise councils’ awareness of their weaknesses, rather than to subject them 
to public humiliation. Welsh ministers adopted by far the most localist stance. They 
argued that whilst external assessment could help to highlight problems, it was local 
politicians who had responsibility for addressing poor performance. Improvement could 
not be imposed from outside; it had to ‘come from within’. Here, local authorities 
prepared their own assessments of their strengths and weaknesses and these self 
assessments were on a par with auditors’ views. The WAO conducted a parallel 
assessment and the two parties then agreed a ‘joint risk assessment’ which specified areas 
in which improvement was required. This document formed the basis of improvement 
and regulatory plans which were tailored to each council’s ‘improvement journey’.  
 
A fourth important contrast was in the use to which assessments were put in the three 
countries. In England, the aggregate performance scores generated by CPA were used to 
place councils into one of five categories - ‘poor’, ‘weak’, ‘fair’, ‘good’, or ‘excellent’. 
These scores and the inspection reports were published, making it easy for ministers, the 
media and the public to work out which councils were judged to be the best performers 
and which were ‘failing’ (Downe 2008). This paved the way for centrally orchestrated 
interventions in those languishing at the bottom of the performance league table. 
Interventions in failing authorities usually involved the replacement of existing 
management teams with interim managers overseen by improvement boards. In addition, 
authorities could access, on a voluntary basis, support from the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA) which provided a range of services including peer review, 
leadership training and organisational development work.  
 
Because BVAs and the WPI explicitly recognized that needs and priorities vary between 
localities, the reports they produced were not amenable to making like-for-like 
comparisons of the kind needed to populate comparative CPA-style rankings. The WAO 
published annual reports on the overall progress being made by Welsh authorities, but 
assessments of individual councils were subject to bilateral confidentiality agreements 
between themselves and the auditors. Ministers and the public therefore had no means of 
knowing how well they were performing or of comparing authorities against each other.  
 
BVA reports were published and could trigger intervention. Councils were required to 
produce detailed improvement plans explaining how they proposed to address 
weaknesses identified by auditors. Implementation of the plans was monitored by 
auditors and where insufficient action was being taken, the Accounts Commission could 
hold a public hearing or recommend to ministers that they take direct action. However, 
unlike CPAs, BVA reports were descriptive. They provided a narrative rather than a 
numerically based judgement and could not therefore be used directly to compare or rank 
councils’ performance. In Scotland, an improvement service was established but it did 
not have the same level of resources or expertise as the IDeA. Interventions in failing 
services in Wales were triggered by service inspections, rather than the WPI and were 
generally low key affairs orchestrated by the WLGA. 
 
Finally, there were differences in the frequency and perceived intensity of the assessment 
processes. In England CPAs results were published annually for 150 unitary and county 
councils between 2002 and 2008. They had huge implications for councils’ reputations 
and the career prospects of their senior managers. Welsh authorities also underwent 
annual assessments but these attracted very little attention because results were not 
published and there were no direct sanctions for poor performance. BVAs were seen as 
having more ‘teeth’ than the WPI because reports could trigger public hearings and 
external intervention. However, they were infrequent. Each Scottish council received just 
one assessment between 2003 and 2009.  
Policy Outcomes 
It is difficult to compare the success of CPAs, BVAs and the WPI through statistical 
analysis because of the lack of baselines and counterfactuals and the absence of 
comparable performance data across the three countries (Andrews and Martin 2010). 
However, our interview data provided evidence about their perceived effectiveness. We 
assessed perceptions of outcomes using a framework derived from Marsh and Sharman 
(2009) who differentiate between: successful processes (the smoothness of policy 
introduction and implementation); programmatic success (the effectiveness, efficiency 
and resilience of a policy); and political success (the level of political support for and 
perceived legitimacy of a policy in the eyes of key stakeholders).  
 
In terms of ‘process success’ the WPI scored highest. Not surprisingly given the role 
which their representatives played in its design, interviewees from Welsh local authorities 
regarded it as a necessary and welcome break with the Best Value regime that it replaced 
and the new framework met with little or no resistance ‘on the ground’. BVAs in 
Scotland encountered more difficulty, particularly in the early stages. Some interviewees 
believed that the focus on corporate capacity was misplaced. They argued that more 
attention should be paid to services and processes of community planning. Some also felt 
that the BVA process was weighted in favour of larger councils that had the staff and 
other resources to manage the assessment process. And there were concerns about what 
was seen as a lack of co-ordination between BVAs and other forms of audit and 
inspection. CPAs met with considerable initial resistance in terms of rhetoric, especially 
from councils that were judged to be performing badly. Some threatened to take their 
cases to judicial review, and doubts were expressed about the statutory basis of CPA. 
Privately the Government and Audit Commission admitted that they had probably 
exceeded their authority and new legislation was therefore introduced to shore up the 
framework.  
 
However, within two to three years of its introduction, English local government had 
largely acquiesced. Interviewees harboured doubts about its fairness; there were 
particular concerns about the lack of explicit adjustment of scores to take account of 
differences in deprivation. But by 2004 most authorities had seen improvements in their 
scores and many were rated as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. They therefore had good reasons to 
‘buy into’ the system in spite of its perceived flaws. 
 The growing acceptance over time of CPAs also reflected its ‘programmatic success’. 
Most of our interviewees in England and Scotland believed that CPAs and BVAs had 
achieved their overall objective of encouraging improvements in corporate capacity. 
Interviewees cited as evidence of success the steady improvement in CPA scores. By 
2006, more than three quarters (78%) of authorities achieved 3 or 4 star rating and none 
were placed in the bottom (no star) category. There is also evidence that a large majority 
of senior council officers believed that CPAs has acted a significant driver of 
improvement in their services (Downe and Martin 2006). However, there were residual 
concerns about the costs of the CPAs and some interviewees believed that there had been 
diminishing marginal returns from successive rounds of CPA. Some believed that part of 
the improvement in CPA scores was attributable to gaming by authorities that had 
become more adept at ‘playing the system’. Whilst it was argued that CPA had led to 
improvement in weaker authorities, it had little impact on the best performers. 
 
As one of the architects of the assessment framework in England put it: ‘CPA has 
undoubtedly raised the floor but it has not raised the roof’. In contrast to CPAs and BVAs, 
many interviewees were uncertain of the effectiveness of the WPI and there was 
widespread dissatisfaction with what was seen as a lack of ‘hard’ evidence of 
improvement by Welsh councils. Ministers and local authority officers in Wales lamented 
the secrecy which surrounded joint risk assessments. The former said that as a result they 
lacked the reassurance that they wanted, whilst the latter argued that the WPI did not do 
justice to the improvements which had been achieved. CPAs enjoyed the confidence of 
ministers for several years, but failed to secure support from across the political spectrum; 
opposition parties continued to argue for its abolition. Initially, the WPI was popular with 
ministers and local authorities, although auditors harboured doubts about its robustness. 
As noted above, however, over time all parties expressed concerns about whether it was 
effective. BVAs achieved the most consistent political support among our interviewees 
and was strongly endorsed by a wide ranging independent review of scrutiny 
arrangements in Scotland (Crerar, 2007). 
EXTENT AND MECHANISMS OF POLICY TRANSFER AND LEARNING 
The literature identifies three kinds of policy transfer in the UK: transfer from the centre 
to the periphery; from the periphery to centre; and around the periphery (Cairney et al. 
2009). Previous studies have suggested that centre-periphery policy transfer whereby 
policies formulated in England are adopted in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales is 
the dominant form of interaction in the UK (Cairney et al 2009, Keating 2007) and there 
are some good reasons for this view. Coercive policy transfer is rare because the division 
of competences between the UK government and devolved administrations is fairly clear 
cut. However, England has the greatest capacity for policy design and prior to devolution 
the role of the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices was often to implement 
policies conceived in London with relatively minor modifications, a process described by 
one of our interviewees in Scotland as ‘putting a kilt on’ English legislation. 
 
In the case of the development of the local government performance improvement 
regimes, there were examples of the ‘periphery’ learning from developments in the 
‘centre’. This tended to take the form of what the literature identifies as ‘soft transfer’ and 
‘simple learning’ (Dolowitz 2009, Evans and Davies 1999), that is emulation, 
hybridisation and inspiration, rather than wholesale copying, and it was more evident in 
Scotland than in Wales. Scottish interviewees reported that BVAs had been influenced 
directly by experience in England. Audit Scotland recruited staff from England which 
enabled it to draw on lessons from the experience of undertaking CPAs. One interviewee 
from Audit Scotland explained that there was:  
a very deliberate focus on looking at the way the existing audit mechanisms could 
be adapted and developed - mechanisms like CPA and the best value inspection 
work that took place in England – rather than looking at starting afresh …..we 
aimed to learn from both CPA and WPI, although … CPA was further ahead than 
the WPI ….’. 
They also told us ‘CPA was probably more influential and I think we learnt a lot from 
particularly the corporate assessment that was going on’. A second interviewee explained 
that Audit Scotland ‘had the advantage of looking at CPA a little way down the line… so 
I think there was a lot of “we can do it our way, we’ve got some clear principles, but 
also what are the good bits that we can use’.  
 
However, the constraints on policy transfer identified by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) 
were also evident. One interviewee from Audit Scotland explained that: ‘the bit that we 
deliberately chose to avoid in CPA …was the area around the rules-based assessment and 
the application of particular labels for how well a council was performing’. According to 
another, the idea of making simple comparisons between the 32 councils in Scotland and 
ranking them was both unfeasible politically and impossible due to the lack of good 
performance indicators including the absence of scored performance data from the 
inspectorates. The relatively small number of Scottish local authorities, the relationship 
between central and local government, and political aspirations to forge a distinctively 
Scottish regime seem to be the most important variables in explaining the emulation and 
hybridisation that occurred in the design of the Scottish regime. 
 
Similarly, policy makers in Wales argued that what Hood (2007) describes as ‘English 
exceptionalism’ - top-down targets, performance measures and league tables – were not 
needed in the small and relatively close knit policy community in which they operate. 
This reflected both the long standing localist tradition in Wales and the statutory 
requirement placed on the Assembly to work in partnership with local councils. It was 
also indicative of the devolved administration’s limited capacity which left civil servants 
dependent on local government for policy input (Jeffery 2006). As a result the WLGA 
was able to wield considerable influence (Laffin 2004) and auditors found themselves in 
a weaker position than in England or Scotland. The documentary evidence shows that 
Welsh stakeholders did undertake an analysis of the Best Value regime and CPAs in 
England. However, interviewees played this down, emphasising the need to develop an 
approach that was ‘fit for purpose in Wales’ (Partnership Minutes, March 2006). An 
interviewee from the WLGA told us that they had used a: ‘fairly limited evidence-base to 
inform the design of WPI. (We) did not do any research across other countries’. And in 
contrast to Scotland, there is no evidence that policy makers asked the question: ‘Under 
what circumstances and to what extent would a programme now in effect elsewhere also 
work here? (Rose 1991: 4). Rather, decisions were driven by the desire to be seen to take 
a distinctive approach. This was in part ideological - one interviewee from the WLGA 
described CPAs as an example of: ‘the worst excesses of Blairite centrism’. It was also 
practical. There probably is little point in compiling performance league tables among 22 
local authorities of widely varying sizes which serve very different kinds of areas. And it 
was linked to the desire to be seen to be acting independently of England.  
 
The case for devolution rested to a large extent on the need for distinctive policies which 
addressed the particular needs of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Bradbury 2003). 
To continue to ape English policies in areas for which the Welsh Assembly was 
responsible therefore made little sense. The abolition of the Best Value regime was seized 
upon by Welsh policy makers as an early opportunity to put in place a distinctive ‘home 
grown’ approach consistent with the then First Minister’s boast of the ‘clear red water’ 
that was opening between policies conceived in Cardiff and Westminster. As a result, the 
development of the WPI was more politicised than the equivalent exercise in Scotland, 
which was treated more as a technical exercise. In Wales the new assessment framework 
broke with the English model in the hope that this would provide an example of 
devolution in practice. The sub text was that this should help to build support for the 
fledging Welsh Assembly which was still uncertain of popular support in the wake of the 
wafer thin majority which voted in favour of devolution in the referendum just four years 
previously. There was also an element of ‘pay back’ in return for local government’s 
support for the new institutions. As one interviewee explained, ‘politically there was a 
mandate for Wales to do their own thing and construct their own improvement 
framework’ (Wales Audit Office). A Welsh civil servant explained that ‘One of the aims 
of devolution was the need to be different, so a lack of policy learning is not so 
surprising’. And a Welsh local authority chief executive told us ‘there is a huge amount 
of prejudice [against English policy instruments] … it seems to be particularly strong 
within the Welsh Assembly Government. I’m sorry to say that it is easier in Wales to 
introduce an idea from Venezuela than London’. 
 
As Duncan (2009: 151) notes ‘policy making in a political context is not just about 
finding the most effective solution to a policy problem; it crucially involves finding 
solutions which fit particular political ideologies and which are seen to be innovative as 
well as effective’. While ideas and policies may be copied from elsewhere, these still 
need to be ‘sold’ to the political elite. In the Welsh context, the political strength of what 
interviewees described as the ‘local government family’ and the strong personal links it 
enjoyed with Assembly Members meant that it was able to argue successfully for a ‘home 
grown’ approach. Although Welsh auditors and their line managers in the Audit 
Commission’s headquarters in London fought a rearguard action to insert some of the 
elements of CPAs into the new Welsh regime, it soon became clear that the odds were 
stacked against them. There was no appetite for lesson drawing based on a dispassionate 
assessment of the appropriateness to Wales of a CPA-type approach. Rather, this was a 
case of what might be called ‘policy avoidance’, driven by the political imperative to be 
seen to be taking a different approach to its neighbour.  
 
There was no evidence of the second kind of policy transfer, from the periphery to the 
centre, and also little evidence of much policy learning in that direction. Given that CPA 
was introduced before the other two regimes, it is perhaps not surprising that there was 
little evidence of policy learning in its development. Although, a senior officer from the 
Audit Commission told us that they were tracking developments in Scotland and Wales, 
most of the other English policy makers and practitioners we interviewed knew very little 
about BVAs or the WPI. Many expressed surprise at the idea that they might have 
anything to learn from these regimes. One senior English civil servant for example told 
us ‘it hadn’t occurred to me to find out about what was happening in Wales and Scotland 
until today’. Similarly, the chief executive of a Welsh local authority reported widespread 
ignorance of the WPI among his colleagues in England ‘I talk to them about the Welsh 
system. And they all go “what?!”. I say, you know this is what’s happening just across 
the border from you and you don’t know’. This seemed to be related in part to a belief 
that the performance of public services in Wales in particular lagged behind those 
England, though this was linked largely to the widely publicised failure to reduce hospital 
waiting times, rather than any analysis of local authority performance.  
 
There was only limited evidence of the third kind of policy transfer (periphery to 
periphery). The representative bodies of local government in Scotland and Wales had 
exchanged information. As an interviewee from Scotland explained that ‘We kept quite 
close to Wales and followed what happened in England. Wales and Northern Ireland have 
been keen to work with us. In England, the Local Government Association is not 
interested in working with us’ (COSLA). Civil servants from the two countries reported 
that they also met on a fairly regular basis, but there was little evidence that they had 
influenced each other’s approaches to the development of their local government 
performance frameworks. 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify seven channels by which transfer might take place: 
politicians; officials; political parties; bureaucrats/civil servants; pressure groups; policy 
entrepreneurs/experts; and supra-national institutions. The development of the local 
government performance improvement regimes in two of the three countries (England 
and Scotland) was determined largely by officials and civil servants. CPAs were designed 
by the Audit Commission with some input from civil servants. In Scotland, the BVA 
architecture was shaped by auditors and civil servants in consultation with representatives 
of local government. In Wales, the principal architect of the WPI was a special 
ministerial advisor to the First Minister, and although the detailed design still involved 
officials and civil servants, the process was more politicised than in the other two 
countries. Some studies have found that think tanks, policy entrepreneurs or transnational 
networks have played key roles in promoting policy transfer (see Stone 2000; 2004) but 
we found that they had almost no influence in this case. Nor was there evidence to 
support Cairney et al’s (2009) suggestion that political parties in the UK act as powerful 
forces for convergence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies have concluded that convergence is often driven by international factors 
whereas divergence is rooted in national institutional factors (Heichel et al 2005). One 
might expect that in the UK ‘similarity of problems, policy communities and parallel 
trends in public opinion’ would ensure that policy in England, Scotland and Wales does 
not differ radically (Cairney et al 2009: 10). Our analysis suggests that the local 
government performance improvement regimes in England, Scotland and Wales share 
similar goals and use similar instruments but there have been significant differences and 
divergences in policy content and style, as well as their outcomes. Faced with similar 
pressures and in pursuit of the same broad objective (improving local government 
performance), policy makers in all three countries have placed considerable faith in 
performance auditing and management. However, they have adopted different kinds of 
performance improvement regime. In spite of similarities in terms of their social, 
economic and legal frameworks, and their shared language and culture, there is only 
limited evidence of policy transfer and policy learning. There were high levels of what 
might be called ‘policy awareness’ in Scotland and Wales, and some lesson drawing and 
‘soft’ policy transfer in Scotland. However, policy makers in England were uninformed 
and unconcerned about developments elsewhere, and the key actors in Wales pursued a 
path of determined policy avoidance. 
 
Interviewees attributed policy divergence and the low levels of ‘hard’ policy transfer to 
two key factors: differences in the nature of the policy communities in the three countries, 
which were manifested particularly in relations between central and local government; 
and ideological differences which were manifested in contrasting theories of performance 
improvement. Interestingly though, in the recent past there have been signs of increasing 
willingness among the key actors in the three systems to learn from each other. As 
Scottish local authorities became aware of the more transparent rules-based system 
embodied in CPAs, they have lobbied successfully for greater transparency in the second 
round of BVAs. In 2009, CPAs were replaced by a new framework known as 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) which was designed to assess the outcomes 
being achieved by all of the public service providers operating in a locality (including 
councils, health trusts, police forces and fire and rescue services). The second round of 
BVAs in Scotland which began in 2009 and the associated Shared Risk Assessments 
have moved in a similar direction by taking an area-based approach to assessment which 
goes beyond the performance of local councils. Meanwhile the Assembly Government 
passed a new local government measure which gives ministers powers to intervene 
directly in failing authorities and requires the auditors to publish performance data on 
each council in Wales, as was already happening in England and Scotland.  
 
Interviewees indicated that as policy makers in Scotland and Wales have become more 
confident, they have become more open to learning lessons from their closest neighbours. 
An official from the WLGA commented that: ‘if we were starting afresh today, we would 
probably try to learn from England’. Another interviewee from the WLGA who was very 
critical of CPA was open to learning from the experience of CAAs in England. He 
explained: ‘I find the Comprehensive Area Assessment a much more interesting approach 
to reviewing services and reviewing improvement programmes and I think there 
are certain things that we could learn from that’. And the Assembly Government in 
Wales has also shown increasing interest in policies from Scotland, notably the duty on 
local partners to co-operate enshrined in Scottish law. 
 
However, it is important not to over-emphasise these recent signs of convergence or to 
exaggerate the appetite for policy learning, and the evidence suggests that the nature of 
the policy-making process in all three countries means that the capacity for hard policy 
transfer is likely to remain limited. The three local government performance regimes are 
developing in parallel and while their architects may be paying more attention to 
developments elsewhere in the UK, they continue to be driven primarily by developments 
within countries rather than by systematic learning between them. As an Audit Scotland 
interviewee commented ‘although many aspects of public service audit and inspection in 
England and Scotland look as if they are converging, the overall feel of these regimes … 
is different’. 
 
There remains considerable pride in local policy development, and many echoes of the 
sentiment expressed in Maesschalck and De Walle’s (2006:1012) study of Flemish policy 
which found support for the rhetoric of ‘what we do ourselves we do better’. These 
findings have a number of implications for future research on policy transfer. They 
confirm the importance of studying policy developments in detail, over time, and from a 
range of different stakeholders’ perspectives, and they highlight the value of enquiring 
into different aspects of policy divergence, from goals through to outcomes. They also 
suggest that following devolution, the UK does provide a source of valuable empirical 
data for studying policy transfer and learning.  
 
Echoing the work of a number of other researchers, including Evans and Davies (1999), 
Marsh and Sharman (2009) and Rose (1993), our conclusion that there has been only 
limited lesson drawing and policy transfer but significant policy avoidance points to the 
need for more research on the reasons why learning between countries does not occur, 
even in apparently favourable conditions such as those offered by the UK. Our data 
suggest that policy avoidance is likely to be greatest, and policy transfer lowest, when 
there is an overriding political objective to demonstrate the need for and efficacy of 
devolution. Policy avoidance is also likely to be high when a policy area connects with a 
distinctive, meta-policy platform, such as the non-competitive philosophy of public 
services policy in Scotland and Wales. Finally, while we have made an initial attempt to 
compare the perceived effectiveness of the three frameworks, it is clear that there is far 
more to be done in this area. As Marsh and Sharman (2009) have suggested, scholars 
interested in policy transfer do need to give greater attention to understanding not just the 
reasons for convergence and divergence, but to its impacts on policy outcomes. 
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Table 1 Local government performance improvement regimes: areas of convergence and 
divergence 
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